Jihad and muslim masculinities: Explaining the recruitment of young men to radical salafist groups and jihadism in Tunisia through socio-economic factors and gender performativity

October 14, 2018

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 

 

I want to thank Stéphane Lacroix for directing my research and giving me the foundation of my knowledge of the Arab state and Islam and politics in the Middle East through his courses at Sciences Po. Our discussions have been a great source of inspiration and guidance in developing my ideas. My 6-month internship with UN Women in Tunisia in 2017 allowed me to experience first-hand how the country has developed since 2011, and therefore I am extremely grateful to my former boss, Héla Skhiri, for giving me the opportunity to work on gender, peace, and security in this context. One of the most important lessons from my internship was that unequal gender relations do not just affect women negatively. Ideas of what masculinity entails have consequences for the way young men act, which only becomes more pronounced in times of conflict. I also want to thank Saloua Ghrissa, president of Association Pour la promotion du Droit à la Différence (ADD), who took the time to talk to me about their study on the major factors leading to youth radicalisation in Tunisia. Moreover, I am indebted to Meher Omrani, youth coordinator of ADD's project working with at-risk youth in Douar Hicher, who gave me valuable insight into the lives of these young people. I am grateful to Margarida Teixeira and Mas Mahmud for their advice and kind encouragements throughout the production of this paper. I also want to thank my parents, Hege and Knut, for supporting and believing in me. Finally, I am grateful to Shams Alles for giving me the strength of an eternal sun. 

 

 

I. INTRODUCTION

 

While Tunisia is the only Arab country undergoing a successful democratic transition following the Arab Uprisings, it has also become home to an emergent Salafi-jihadi movement following the ousting of former president Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali in January 20111. Democratic institutions were set up in Tunisia after the 2014 elections; however, the consolidation of democracy depends on the involvement of women and young people in public and socio-economic life, and studies and election surveys attest to a serious disengagement, especially among young people2. This participation is even weaker at the local level because of the marginalisation of certain regions, favouring phenomena such as radicalisation, jihad, and smuggling, thus developing areas of lawlessness. The radical Salafists have been able to establish themselves in certain regions, overcoming the lack of public services, both politically and socioeconomically. 

 

Tunisia has sent more foreign fighters abroad to join the ranks of Islamic State than any other country in the world. Ben Ali’s monopolisation of the religious sphere and neglect of socioeconomic issues, which arguably made radical movements attractive to disillusioned youth, have led to intensifying violence in Tunisia and the export of foreign fighters to Syria, Iraq, and Libya3. I want to examine how the radicalisation process relates to questions of identity with new rigorous forms of religiosity and Islamic challenges gradually attracting more and more young people. The identity of young men4 who have been radicalised are shaped by gender constructs and practices, along with other contextual elements. I will examine how gender performativity relates to extremism and the desire of finding a way out of difficult socio-economic conditions using empirical data provided by ADD’s study on the major factors leading to youth radicalisation in Douar Hicher and Zarzouna5. 

 

 

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

 

My research questions are therefore the following: How can we explain the rise of Salafist jihadist movements in the aftermath of the popular uprisings of 2011 in Tunisia? Is it linked to the democratisation process, socio-economic factors, or could it be explained by gender theory? What are the motivations of young people joining radical Salafist movements, is it based on religious conviction, precarious economic situations or identity politics?  

 

 

II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

 

RADICALISATION, EXTREMISM, AND TERRORISM

 

 While radicalisation and extremism are often used interchangeably in political discourse and the press, it is important to distinguish popular understanding from legal and academic definitions. According to the European Commission, radicalisation seeks to change the existing political and social structure but is not necessarily violent. Extremism, on the other hand, is considered to be the adoption of a particular ideology with the intention to use violence to remove the state or ruling structure and its elites6. They thus provide the following definition of radicalisation "embracing opinions, views, and ideas which could lead to acts of terrorism"7. Defining terrorism has however proved more difficult, given that there exists no universal legally binding definition. The European Union's Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism provided the following legal definition of terrorism nevertheless: 

 

An intentional act which may seriously damage a country or an international organisation, committed with the aim of seriously intimidating a population, unduly compelling a Government or an international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act, seriously destabilising or destroying fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures by means of attacks…8. 

 

According to Anthony Richards, the merging of ‘terrorism’, ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ into a single discursive framework contributes to the blurring of the important distinction between ‘extremism’ of thought and ‘extremism’ of method9. Terrorism has often been classified according to the ideology or belief-system of its perpetrators. There are belief-systems to which violence is integral, and ideologies may be interpreted or distorted to explicitly justify the use of terrorism.  In such cases, terrorism may become ‘ideologically embedded’10. It could be argued that this is the case with Al-Qaeda and the notion of terrorism and political violence as a religious duty. Richards argues that terrorism is not something inherent to any particular non-violent ideology; it is a method of violence that has at some time or other been perpetrated in the cause of doctrines within all of these categories. Therefore, terrorism should be understood and conceptualised as a particular method of violence, regardless of the ideological cause of the ones deploying it. Terrorism should thus be ‘defined by the nature of the act, not by the identity of the perpetrators or the nature of their cause’11.

 

When it comes to “religious radicalism” within political Islam or Islamism, understood as both ideology and movement, we find Salafist groups which are non-violent. It should be emphasised that religious radicalism uses various strategies that may include political and reformist actions, cultural struggle and the strengthening of the community of believers through missionary work12.  Most definitions of Salafism in the academic literature underline that the term derives from the expression al-salaf al-salih (the pious ancestors) and that Salafists consider that the Qur’an and the hadith (Prophetic tradition) are the only legitimate sources of religious conduct and reasoning13. Generally, Salafists are considered to represent a more literalist and puritan approach to Islamic doctrine and practice. There is only one specific interpretation of Salafism which focuses on the use of violence to bring about radical change, commonly known as Salafist Jihadism14.

 

 

JIHAD IN ISLAM

 

Jihad is a central concept in Islam, which literally means “exertion” or “effort”. On one hand, it refers to efforts made by Muslims to improve the situation of religion and relations between men by reflection and prayer15. On the other hand, it refers to the different modes of expanding religion. While Jihad is often used in the media as a synonym for terrorism, the original meaning goes far beyond this understanding. In Sunni Fiqh, there has traditionally been a distinction between Jihad al-talab (offensive jihad) and jihad al-daf’ (defensive jihad). Offensive jihad is generally perceived to provide a religious cover to the military expansion of the Islamic world through conquest, while defensive jihad is the individual duty (fard ayn) of every Muslim to defend the “homeland under threat” in the name of the Ulama (Islamic religious establishment). While the former takes place within the realm of political authority, and is carried out by soldiers and volunteers, the second calls on all believers and takes precedence over all other social values and obligations.  Jihad al-daf’ requires all Muslims to participate in a manner appropriate to their means, by arms, if not with funds, and at the very least by prayer, to ensure the survival of the community of believers16. However, as Kepel points out, the supreme arm of Islam can be a two-edged sword; if the control over jihad slips out of the hands of the Ulama, it endangers the established order and can lead to chaos17. The jihad of defence was proclaimed immediately after the invasion of Afghanistan by the Red Army in December 1979 and was about defending the Islamic land of Afghanistan from the Soviet infidels. The jihadists that fought there later moved on to other Muslim lands that were being occupied by foreign powers. 

 

 

THE SALAFIST MOVEMENT IN TUNISIA

 

Salafism in Tunisia is generally considered to be imported from Saudi Arabia and completely foreign to traditional local Islam. From a genealogical point of view, Tunisian Salafism is the product of a disagreement within the Islamic Tendency Movement (ancestor of Ennahda) in the 1980s on the issue of democratic procedures and elections. Some militants left the party and created the Tunisian Islamic Front (Front Islamique Tunisien - FIT) in 1986, the first Salafist group in the country. FIT was severely repressed from 1990 and dissolved because of the dispersion of its militants; some were exiled, others imprisoned, while the most radical left to fight in the Afghan and Bosnian jihad18. As they returned or were liberated after the 2011 revolution, some of the activists structured the Salafist movement into associations and political parties19. However, this effort met several obstacles, pertaining to the different objectives of the factions. The apolitical quietist Salafist movement who was allowed to operate in Tunisia under Ben Ali did not wish to institutionalise Salafism, while a new generation of young Salafists was less inclined to participate in politics, but also more likely to be radicalised.

 

With the uprisings and ousting of Ben Ali on January 14, 2011, the Salafist movement benefitted from a new era marked by individual liberties and freedom of expression. The religious field, hitherto monopolised and controlled by the State, saw the appearance of new religious actors, which capitalised on the collapse of the legitimacy of the official imams. Salafist sheiks gained influence, especially in the most disadvantaged inner regions by offering religious and social services20. In the time following the revolution there appears to be a generational separation within the Salafist movement; the elders seek to integrate institutional politics, while young people focus on “street politics”21. In Tunisia, the regime change results in a renewal of the vocabulary employed to talk about politics. Some Salafists begin to use the terms nation (wa?an) and citizens (muw??in?n) where the notions of community (umma) and subjects (ra'aya) were traditionally used. The claim of fundamental rights (al-?uq?q al-as?siyya) and general freedoms (al-?urriyy?t al-'?mma) also became a part of their discourse following the revolution22.

 

GENDER PERFORMATIVITY AND JIHADISM

 

Maleeha Aslam argues that Muslim leadership in post-colonial societies has failed to deliver within locally “modified” Western frameworks of governance. The leadership has failed to provide an innovative “vision” and “agenda” for growth and prosperity to its people. As a consequence, the political agency of Muslim social capital, consisting of many troubled but energetic young men, has been absorbed in Islamist and terrorist networks23. Aslam argues that Muslim men participate in militant-jihadist Islamism as an act of gender performativity; thus, gender constructs and practices, along with other contextual elements, play an important role in influencing and propelling young men towards militant-jihadist Islamism and terrorism24. Aslam uses Judith Butler’s gender performativity25 and Raewyn Connell’s notion of multiple masculinities26 to explore militant-jihadist Islamism and terrorism among Muslim men. 

 

Inspired by Beauvoir, Butler considers gender to be “styles of flesh”. The styles may have occurred because of historical contexts as well as other factors, and thus cultural histories and processes need to be considered in understanding variations in styles of the flesh27.  Gender is understood by Butler as a “corporeal style, an act” that may be intentional and performative, which indicates a contingent construction of meaning28. Connell’s theory of multiple masculinities accentuates the significance of social structures and cultural, political and socio-economic contexts within which Muslim masculinities are being defined, shaped and manifested. The context of British and French colonialism in the Muslim world is used to “historicize” Muslim masculinities29. According to this argument, post-colonial Muslim men share a collective sentiment of being marginalised in their own countries and in the global society. The marginalisation is not limited to economic deprivation but may also include social isolation at the edge of politics, race and religion30. While Aslam provides a pilot study of Pakistani Muslim masculinities, I will use a similar approach to examine the Tunisian case through the empirical data provided by ADD’s study on the major factors leading to youth radicalisation31. 

 

 

III. ANALYSIS: THE RISE OF SALAFIST EXTREMISM IN TUNISIA 

POST-ARAB UPRISINGS

 

III.I. DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION AND THE RISE OF JIHADISM:  A PARADOX?

 

Tunisia is often portrayed by Western media as "a breeding ground for global terrorism32", while at the same time being presented as the success story of the so-called Arab Spring with the following democratization process. This begs the question of whether there is a link between the two. According to a 2015 study by the Soufan Group, between 6000 and 7000 Tunisian jihadists have left for conflict zones, most of them to Syria33. This is the highest contribution by any of the more than 100 countries who have provided a total of estimably 30.000 foreign fighters to Syria34. Meddeb suggests that to understand this "paradox" we must go back to the 2000-2010 decade which was marked by an important mobilisation of Tunisian youth in a severe confrontation with the Ben Ali regime. This period was characterised by the high politicization of Tunisian youth with the Palestinian intifada in 2002, invasion of Iraq in 2003, the confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah in 2006 and the clash between Israel and Hamas in 2008. These moments played out against the backdrop of acute social crisis: rising unemployment hit university graduates leading the first actions of the movement of unemployed graduates in 2005 paired with the hardening of Ben Ali's regime and the repression of protest35. Meddeb believes that jihadism benefited from the acute crisis, and that repression only filled the ranks of the radicals and turned prisons into veritable incubators for jihadists36. 

 

According to a study carried out by the Tunisian National Observatory for Youth37,  1 out of 3 young men and 1 out of 2 young women between the age of 15 and 29 are NEET (not in education, nor in employment, nor in training)38. 67,3% of these young people are located in the southern or the interior regions of Tunisia39. According to Meddeb, the border economy of Tunisia (el khat), which includes smuggling and fraud, is an important social factor that has not been spared by the political upheavals in Tunisia since 201140.  Rather, the marginalisation of the border regions and the lack of development policies for decades have turned these fraudulent activities into a true "economy of necessity” and incarnates a form of " development by substitution" of impoverished territories41. The democratic process has not changed anything from this point of view since the economic situation has only worsened further. The collective hope of change provided by the revolution has disappeared and has given way to economic disenchantment. There is no mobilizing project and no political or religious institution is able to supervise young people. As an understanding of Islam based on the centrality of the struggle, jihadism is a formidable provider of meaning for a generation that feels forced into battle42. 

 

Another important factor was the total lack of reflections on the economic model to adapt after the revolution. The first development plan came in 2016, the Tunisia 2016-2020 project. This only goes to show that economic question wasn’t a priority after the fall of Ben Ali. Consecutive governments since 2011 were incapable of making important social and economic decisions for fear of alienating three essential forces in the country: the UGTT (Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail); the administration - perceived by successive governments to be a remnant of the former regime and to be capable of blocking their decisions -; and businessmen, who form an important and influential interest group in the media and who have tried to protect their wallets  and privileges in a new and uncertain context43. According to Meddeb, it is time to review economic priorities and above all escape the Ben Ali regime's political economy which was centered on the creation and protection of different kinds of revenues, on the clientelist management of the social groups who benefit from them and on the perversion of the rule of law44. Thus, people’s demand for economic and social inclusion should be responded to with “more state but in other ways45”. This means reinventing the state in Tunisia, beginning with the long-delayed decentralization process.

 

 

III.II. SALAFIST YOUTH: A PRODUCT OF BEN ALI’S REGIME?

 

It has been argued that the emergence of Salafist youth movements is a product of the Ben Ali regime, based on an authoritarian state with an economy favoring the elites, and leaving out the working classes, who in turn experienced a deprivation in living standard46. According to Meddeb, the poorly educated and disadvantaged youth suffers from a double crisis of future and meaning, with the lack of prospects going hand in hand with the quest for a new spirituality47 . Fabio Merone and Francesco Cavatorta go even further and argue that “Islam provides these young people with points of reference to explain their marginal socio-economic condition and a way out”48. Ben Ali’s firm control over the religious sphere meant there were few religious groups to fill the void after the fall of the regime, which in turn made it possible for radical groups to preach their ideas and convert new supporters among the marginalised youth. Ennahda focused on constitution building and political struggles after the revolution and was not able to strike a reasonable balance between politics and religion. Furthermore, their failure to break with the past political system opened the door for social and political contestation49. J. P. Filiu argues that the way of governing by The Arab ruling elite building up to the 2011 uprisings slowly turned the remnants of the colonial governing model into a dystopian system. This model of governing which looks solely after the elites’ interests and uses all the tools of a police state to stay in power and loot the economy have conjured into existence an even more evil twin, namely, the Islamic jihadist50. 

 

Violent radicalisation in Tunisia has a significant generational dimension: according to the figures of the Tunisian Center for Research and Studies on Terrorism, 80% of the detainees in the context of terrorism cases belong to the category 18-34 years old51. The study also showed that about 40% of a sample of 1,000 Tunisian terrorists were university graduates. Young people were expecting a lot from the democratic transition, but the socio-economic situation that followed was not conducive for them to realize their dreams. These young people, weakened by the economic crisis, felt more and more marginalised in society. This marginalisation has created an ideal environment for the proliferation of radical ideas. Added to this are the failures of successive governments to put in place sustainable strategies to deal with the difficulties experienced by these young people52. Violent engagement contributes to legitimising this rejection of a corrupt and unjust society and to glorifying the victimisation of individuals who have not been given an opportunity to escape. Jihadism has, therefore, become a particularly important discourse of rupture for many young men.  

 

III.III. RELIGION AS MOBILISATION & GENDER AS JUSTIFICATION

 

Popovski illustrates the significance of religion as a mobilizing tool and emphasizes: “religions do not produce conflict directly, but they can easily be employed as . . . a propaganda strategy to mobilize more fighters”53. If religion “mobilizes” individuals, Aslam argues that gender “justifies” for individuals their combative and confrontational actions54. She aims to shift the discussion on counterterrorism from religion to gender, by examining how socially prescribed and idealized norms for the male gender make men willing to experiment with militant-jihadist Islamism, and even terrorism. These acts carried out with the goal of alleviating financial hardships and social inadequacies or seeking adventure and the lifestyle of a "hero" is a way of confirming their "manliness"55. This explains why men indulge in risky behaviors and displays of physical force either to assert or regain their (lost) “honor”. ADD believes that misery, academic failure, the feeling of humiliation and neglect made young people in the two ghettoized areas examined favorable to the preaching of radical Islam linked to the jihadist groups. The transformation of feelings of frustration and denigration into hatred of the society preached by a 'rigorous Islam' in an explicit and sacred normative framework thus allows radicalised social actors and actresses to build a new imaginary identity exalting the elevation, the heroism and the norms of the sacred56.

 

Aslam’s theory is also interesting seen together with ADDs analysis of young people's reasoning for joining radical Salafist movements. ADD argues that the radicalisation of these groups takes place within the question of 'identity' with new rigorous forms of religiosity and 'Islamic' challenges gradually attracting more and more young people. Radical discourse, often presented by influential sheikhs, could be said to offer a 'virtual' identity, promoting the “ready to consume” way of life, based on the hatred of the other and the current world whose primary goal is self-confirmation within an ideal world that places radicalised people in a 'divine' mission57. In this way, religion provides refuge for the expectations of young people and generally leads to changes in attitudes, which makes it possible to escape a hard-to-change reality. This is coherent with Aslam argument that “wartime roles” which are assigned to men, are manifestations by which existing cultural and psychological understandings of gender roles are further authenticated and made relevant to current political contexts58.  

 

Therefore, it becomes apparent that it does not suffice to explain youth radicalisation by religious, political and socio-economic factors alone. In line with Olivier Roy, ADD argues that “violent radicalisation is not the consequence of religious radicalisation, even though it often borrows its paths and paradigms”59. The study carried out in the delegations of Zarzouna and Douar Hicher sustains this observation and showed that the process of radicalisation, is complex to the extent that there is no predictable standard path of the radicalised individual. On the other hand, there is a set of subjective factors that act mutually to lead to the pronounced risk of radicalisation. While 90.3% of those surveyed are reluctant to engage in radical groups, 7% are sympathetic to these movements because of the socio-economic services undertaken by these groups60. Given that the majority of the young people interviewed by ADD did not have any fixed income of their own this shouldn’t come as a surprise. One of the most salient observations in the case study, however, is how the lack of places of leisure favors the apathy of young people, which in turn make them resort to other existing places, such as the Internet and the mosque (including those beyond the control of the state). This, in turn, becomes a space of socialization on the margins of society and a fertile ground for the recruitment of young people to radical Salafist movements61. 

 

 

IV. DISCUSSION: EXPLAINING YOUTH RECRUITMENT TO EXTREMISM AND JIHADISM IN TUNISIA

 

Throughout this paper, we have seen how jihadism has become a global phenomenon, facilitated by the interconnectedness of modern times with the internet and extensive travelling. In this context the traditional ideas of nation states and borders become inept. Therefore, the framing of Tunisia as a "jihadist breeding ground" seems utterly out of touch with contemporary time.  Rather, violent radicalisation must be understood as a complex global phenomenon where boundaries no longer make sense. As an example, the radicalisation of both Anis Amri, the perpetrator of the Berlin bombing, and that of Mohamed Lahouij, the perpetrator of the attack in Nice, took place on European soil62. Nevertheless, the recruitment of young men to extremist and terrorist groups in Tunisia should not be disregarded. According to the Tunisian Minister of Interior, Hédi Mejdoub, no less than 27,371 people have been prevented from leaving the territory since 2013, suspected of trying to join the ranks of Islamic State63. This astoundingly high number indicates that the Tunisian state is failing to integrate its youth and giving them viable alternatives. 

 

Leila Talani argues that the crisis of the Arab state within globalisation seems to produce an increasing radicalisation of society, with all it implies in terms of further marginalisation. She sees globalisation an “a sort of virtuous circle that once activated produces more and more integration”64. Therefore, societies that are unable to keep up with this constant updating are doomed to become more and more marginalised and worse off from globalisation. According to Talani, the Arab world has experienced the crisis of the nation-state as a consequence of globalisation and the lack of a regional integration project in the MENA, which has been accompanied by a progressive re-Islamization of civil society, reflected in the emergence of a distinct Islamic social capital65. As a consequence of the extremely repressive nature of the Tunisian regime in more recent years, the Islamist movements could not be actively involved in social and charity activities on the ground, nevertheless, the re-Islamization of the Tunisian society was a reality for at least a decade before the uprising of 201166.  

 

When we look at ADDs study on factors conducing to youth radicalisation in Tunisia, it is apparent that the state is considered responsible for youth recruitment to jihadist groups because of its inability to reduce unemployment and poverty and to establish an inclusive education system. It must be noted that the majority of those interviewed by ADD were unemployed and did not have any source of income which naturally leads to anguish. This, in turn, explains the fact that socio-economic factors have gained the upper hand when it comes to analysing the factors of radicalisation of young people67. When it comes to religious conviction, the study indicates that 75% of those surveyed are practicing Muslims, the majority of whom pray at the mosque on a regular basis (60%)68. This indicates that while religion certainly is an important part of their lives, it seems to gain importance in times of hardship, and cannot be understood as the sole reason for joining radical Salafist groups. 

 

Aslam suggests that a predominance of men as terrorists and suicide bombers is suggestive of an upheaval in practices of Muslim masculinities69. Muslim masculinity based on class resentment must be understood within contexts of marginalised existences and protest expressions. In this sense, the oppression and occupation of Muslim populations and lands intrude upon the basic dignity of manhood which creates a crisis for young men. When we look at the construction of Tunisian masculinity, it becomes evident that the crisis of youth unemployment and lack of opportunities more generally have put young Tunisian men in a difficult situation where they feel like they have little or no options. Radical Salafist groups are able to recruit these young men in spaces such as mosques that are not supervised by the state because it often becomes the only meeting place in disadvantaged areas. The radical Salafist groups have succeeded in adapting their cause by including words like fundamental rights and general freedoms in their discourse to fit the visions of young men who were disappointed by the result of the popular uprisings. The lack of decent alternative makes jihad appealing in the eyes of troubled young men; they are offered a noble cause giving them meaning and the economic means to obtain their independence and respect from those around them. In that sense, these young men young men could be said to regain the “honor” they have lost as a result of being unemployed and suffering from the economic crisis. 

 

Aslam sees the relationship between gender performativity and politics as one of the most critical elements to be considered for successfully narrowing down militant and terrorist tendencies among huge populations of men across the Muslim world. This leads us to the question of how tangible this disruption in the practice of global masculinity is, and whether it can be reversed? Connell is optimistic and argues the crisis may strike a peculiar system, where masculinity is only a configuration of certain practices within this larger system of gender relations70. In other words, attempts can be made at transforming certain practices that characterise masculinity, which in turn is promising for the understanding of masculinity and deradicalisation71.  

 

V. CONCLUSION

 

This paper has shown that the rise of radical Salafist movements and jihadism in the aftermath of the popular uprisings of 2011 in Tunisia cannot be explained by socioeconomic factors or religion alone. To frame it as a "new phenomenon" linked to the democratisation process after 2011 also appears short-sighted, given the Islamisation of society and youth mobilisation that took place in the first decade of the 2000s. Rather, I argue that we must understand the precarious economic situation experienced by the majority of young people in rural areas, paired with the deception of the democratic transition in interplay with gender relations. I thus agree with Aslam’s view of religion as mobilisation and gender as justification. Young women suffer from the same socio-economic context as their male counterparts, and yet the large majority of young people who become radicalised and join jihadist movements are men. Therefore, it is evident that the gender component and constructions of Muslim masculinities must be considered to produce effective deradicalisation measures. Gender performances are temporal and there is always an opening for introducing or rejecting certain practices of the masculine gender. In the context of preventing youth recruitment to jihadist groups in Tunisia, there is, therefore, reason to be hopeful if the state implements a strategy that prioritizes prevention and tackles the roots of radicalisation. However, in order to succeed, it must focus on both the socioeconomic factors and how gender relations shape ideas of masculinity and the motivations of young men.

 

 

VI. BIBLIOGRAPHY 

 

BOOKS

 

Aslam, Maleeha (2012) Gender-based explosions: the nexus between Muslim masculinities, jihadist Islamism, and terrorism, Tokyo; New York; Paris: United Nations University press 

 

Butler, Judith (2007). Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. New York and London: Routledge, pp 1-305. 

 

Connell, Raewyn (2005). Masculinities. Second Edition. Cambridge: Polity Press. [History and critique of theories of masculinity, with the life-history study of contrasting groups of Australian men.] pp. 1-349. 

 

Filiu, J.P. (2016) From Deep State to Islamic State: The Arab Counter-Revolution and its Jihadi Legacy, (CERI Series in Comparative Politics and International Studies, Oxford University Press, pp 1-224. 

 

Hashmi, Taj (2014) “Chapter 5: Global Jihad: Philosophies and Flashpoints” in Global Jihad and America: The Hundred-Year War Beyond Iraq and Afghanistan, pp. 164-206. 

 

Hegghammer, Thomas (2009) "Jihadi Salafis or Revolutionaries: On Religion and Politics in the Study of Islamist Militancy", in R Meijer (ed), Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement, (London/New York: Hurst/Columbia University Press, 2009), pp. 244-266.

 

Jenkins, Brian (1981) “The study of terrorism: definitional problems”, in Yonah Alexander and J. M. Gleason, eds, Behavioural and quantitative perspectives on terrorism, New York: Pergamon, pp. 1-396. 

 

Meddeb, Hamza (2015) “Rente frontalière et injustice sociale en Tunisie” (Chapter 2) in 

L’État d’injustice au Maghreb. Maroc et Tunisie. Paris:  Éditions Karthala ; Centre de recherches internationales, pp. 63-98. 

 

Popovski, Vesselin (2009) “Religion and War”, in V. Popovski, G. M. Reichberg and N. Turner (eds) World Religions and Norms of War. Tokyo: United Nations University Press, pp. 1-372. 

 

Roy, Olivier (2016) Le djihad et la mort, Paris, Seuil, pp. 1-176. 

ACADEMIC ARTICLES:  

Anderson, Lisa (October 1987) “The State in the Middle East and North Africa”, Comparative Politics, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 1-18.

 

Gilles Kepel (2003) “The origins and development of the Jihadist movement: from anti-communism to terrorism”, Asian Affairs, 34:2, pp. 91-108. 

 

Meddeb, Hamza & Fahmi, Georges (October 2015) “Market for Jihad. Radicalisation in Tunisia”, Carnegie Middle East Center, pp. 1-30. 

 

Meijer, Roel (January 2017) « Salafisme : de l’observation doctrinale à l’engagement politique », in Salafisme: Un islam mondialisé ?, Moyen-Orient n° 33, pp. 28-33.

 

Merone, Fabio & Cavatorta, Francesco (17.08.2012) “The emergence of Salafism in Tunisia”, Jadaliyya, available:

http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/6934/the-emergence-of-salafism-in-tunisia

 [Accessed 25 April 2018].

 

Merone , Fabio & Cavatorta, Francesco (2012) “Salafist mouvance and sheikh-ism in the Tunisian democratic transition”, Working Papers in International Studies, Centre for International Studies, Dublin City University, n°7/2012, pp. 1-19. 

 

Munt, Harry (June 2015) ““No two religions”: Non-Muslims in the early Islamic Hijaz”, Bulletin of SOAS, Vol.78:2 pp. 249–269.

 

Popovski, V. (2009) “Religion and War”, in V. Popovski, G. M. Reichberg and N. Turner (eds) World Religions and Norms of War. Tokyo: United Nations University Press, pp. 11–29.

 

Richards, Anthony (2015) ‘From terrorism to ‘radicalisation’ to ‘extremism’: counterterrorism imperative or loss of focus?’, International Affairs, 91(2), pp. 371-380.

 

Storm, Lise (2009) “The Persistence of Authoritarianism as a Source of Radicalisation in North Africa”, Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944, Vol. 85, No. 5, North Africa in Transition, pp. 997-1013. 

 

Talani, Leila Simona (2017) «Women, Globalisation and Civil Society in the MENA Area: Between Marginalisation and Radicalisation», Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 19:5, pp. 499-523, available: https://doi.org/10.1080/19448953.2017.1296258 

[Accessed 27 April 2018].

 

Torelli, Stefano, Merone, Fabio & Cavatorta, Francesco (2012) “Salafism in Tunisia: Challenges and Opportunities for Democratization”, Middle East Policy, Volume 19 Issue 4 Winter, pp. 140–154. 

 

 

STUDIES AND REPORTS

 

Association pour la promotion du Droit à la Différence (ADD) & ONU Femmes (2017) Le plafond de verre : Etude basée sur l’Analyse en Composante Principale (ACP) sur les processus des facteurs majeurs de la radicalisation des jeunes des deux sexes à Zarzouna et Douar Hicher en Tunisie, [online], pp. 1-44, available: http://www2.unwomen.org/-/media/field%20office%20maghreb/documents/publications/2017/07/etude%20fr%20vf%2026%2007.pdf?la=fr&vs=4342  [Accessed 25 April 2018].

 

European Commission (March 2015) Religious fundamentalism and radicalisation [online], pp. 1-8, available: 

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/551342/EPRS_BRI(2015)551342_EN.pdf  [Accessed 25 April 2018].

 

European Commission Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation (March 2008) Radicalisation processes leading to acts of terrorism, [online], pp. 1-20, available:  

http://www.rikcoolsaet.be/files/art_ip_wz/Expert%20Group%20Report%20Violent%20Radicalisation%20FINAL.pdf  [Accessed 25 April 2018].

 

 

European Council (13 June 2002) Council Framework Decision on combating terrorism (2002/475/JHA), [online], available: 

 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32002F0475  [Accessed 25 April 2018].

 

International Crisis Group (22 June 2016) “Jihadist Violence in Tunisia: The Urgent Need for a National Strategy”, Briefing N° 50 /Middle East and North Africa, [online], available: 

https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/tunisia/jihadist-violence-tunisia-urgent-need-national-strategy [Accessed 26 April 2018].

 

The Soufan Group (2015), An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria and Iraq, [online], pp. 1-26, available:

 http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/TSG_ForeignFightersUpdate3.pdf

[Accessed 25 April 2018].

 

Tunisian Center for Research and Studies on Terrorism (2016) Le terrorisme en Tunisie à travers les dossiers judiciaires, available: 

https://ftdes.net/fr/terrorisme-tunisie-a-travers-dossiers-judiciaires/ [Accessed 25 April 2018].

 

 

INTERVIEWS AND NEWS ARTICLES

 

Amghar, Samir (18.03.2012) «Qui sont les salafistes tunisiens? », Kapitalis, available:

http://www.kapitalis.com/politique/8876-qui-sont-les-salafistes-tunisiens.html 

[Accessed 25 April 2018].

 

Lakhal, Malek & Szakal, Vanessa (27.01.2018), “Interview with Hamza Meddeb: “The system keeps youth at the margins of society” , Nawaat, [online],  available: https://nawaat.org/portail/2018/01/27/interview-with-hamza-meddeb-the-system-keeps-youth-at-the-margins-of-society/ [Accessed 25 April 2018].

 

Portes, Thierry (23.12.2016) “La Tunisie, ce vivier du terrorisme mondial», Le Figaro, [online],  available: http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2016/12/22/01003-20161222ARTFIG00196-la-tunisie-ce-vivier-du-terrorisme-mondial.php [Accessed 25 April 2018].

 

Soudani, Seif (27.12.2016) “Tunisie. Hamza Meddeb: « La montée de la radicalisation n’est pas liée à la démocratisation »”, Le Courrier d’Atlas [online], available: 

https://www.lecourrierdelatlas.com/tunisie-hamza-meddeb-«-la-montee-de-la-radicalisation-n-est-pas-liee-a-la-democratisation-»--7021 [Accessed 25 April 2018].

 

T. H. (21.04.2017) “Qui a envoyé des jeunes tunisiens combattre avec Daech : les premières révélations du ministre de l’Intérieur, Hédi Mejdoub”, Leaders, [online],  available: 

http://www.leaders.com.tn/article/22145-qui-a-envoye-des-jeunes-tunisiens-combattre-avec-daech-les-premieres-revelations-du-ministre-de-l-interieur-hedi-mejdoub [Accessed 25 April 2018].

 

 

FATWAS

 

Al Qaeda (23 august 1996) “Declaration of Jihad Against Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Mosques”, available: 

http://college.cengage.com/history/primary_sources/world/two_holy_mosques.htm 

[Accessed 28 April 2018].

 

World Islamic Front (23 February 1998) “World Islamic Front Statement Urging Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders”, available: https://fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm

[Accessed 28 April 2018].

1 Meddeb Hamza & Fahmi Georges (October 2015) “Market for Jihad. Radicalisation in Tunisia”, Carnegie Middle East Center.

 

2 See Association pour la promotion du Droit à la Différence (ADD) & ONU Femmes (2017) Le plafond de verre : Etude basée sur l’Analyse en Composante Principale (ACP) sur les processus des facteurs majeurs de la radicalisation des jeunes des deux sexes à Zarzouna et Douar Hicher en Tunisie 

 

3 Meddeb Hamza & Fahmi Georges op. cit. (October 2015)

 

4 In ADD’s study, 450 young people were interviewed. With the following definition of extremism; “the willingness to accept recourse to violence, without, necessarily turning to the exercise of violence”, they considered that 4,8 % were radicalised. Men make up 90,90 % while women make up 9,09% of radicalised individuals interviewed, which is why I chose to focus on men. Droit à la Différence (ADD) & ONU Femmes op. cit.  (2017) pp. 22. 

 

5 ADD & ONU Femmes op. cit. (2017). 

 

6 European Commission (March 2015) “Religious fundamentalism and radicalisation”, European Parliamentary Research Service, pp. 5. 

 

7 Ibid. 

 

8 Council Framework Decision (13 June 2002) on combating terrorism. (2002/475/JHA). 

 

9 Richards, Anthony (2015) ‘From terrorism to ‘radicalisation’ to ‘extremism’: counterterrorism imperative or loss of focus?’, International Affairs, 91(2), pp. 375. 

 

10 Richards, Anthony (2015) op. cit. pp. 375.

 

11 Jenkins, Brian (1981) “The study of terrorism: definitional problems”, in Yonah Alexander and J. M. Gleason, eds, Behavioural and quantitative perspectives on terrorism, pp. 2–3.

 

12 European Commission op. cit.  (March 2015) pp. 5. 

 

13 Hegghammer, Thomas (2009) "Jihadi Salafis or Revolutionaries: On Religion and Politics in the Study of Islamist Militancy", in R Meijer (ed), Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement, pp. 248. 

 

14 European Commission op. cit. (March 2015) pp. 6. 

 

15 Gilles Kepel (2003) “The origins and development of the Jihadist movement: from anti-communism to terrorism”, Asian Affairs, 34:2, pp. 92. 

 

16 Gilles Kepel op. cit. (2003) pp.93. 

 

17 Ibid.

 

18 Torelli, Stefano, Merone, Fabio & Cavatorta, Francesco (2012) “Salafism in Tunisia: Challenges and Opportunities for Democratization”, Middle East Policy, pp. 141.

 

19 Amghar, Samir (18.03.2012) «Qui sont les salafistes tunisiens?», Kapitalis. 

 

20 Meddeb Hamza & Fahmi Georges op. cit. (October 2015).

 

21 Merone, Fabio & Cavatorta, Francesco (17.08.2012) “The emergence of Salafism in Tunisia”, Jadaliyya.

 

22 Meijer, Roel (January 2017) « Salafisme : de l'observation doctrinale à l'engagement politique », in Salafisme: Un Islam mondialisé ?, Moyen-Orient n° 33, pp. 28-33.

 

23 Aslam, Maleeha (2012) Gender-based explosions: the nexus between Muslim masculinities, jihadist Islamism, and terrorism. 

 

24 Ibid. pp. 3. 

 

25 Butler, Judith (2007). Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. 

 

26 Connell, Raewyn (2005). Masculinities. Second Edition.

 

27 Aslam, Maleeha op. cit. (2012) pp. 80. 

 

28g Butler, Judith op. cit. (2007) pp. 190. 

 

29 Aslam, Maleeha op. cit. (2012) pp. 74. 

 

30 Ibid. 

 

31 ADD & ONU Femmes op. cit. (2017).  

 

32 See Portes, Thierry (23.12.2016) “La Tunisie, ce vivier du terrorisme mondial», Le Figaro. 

 

33 Soufan Group (2015) FOREIGN FIGHTERS: An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria and Iraq.  

 

34 Ibid. 

 

35 Soudani, Seif (27.12.2016) "Tunisie. Hamza Meddeb: « La montée de la radicalisation n'est pas liée à la démocratisation », Le Courrier d’Atlas.

 

36 Ibid. 

 

37 Observatoire National de la Jeunesse (2017) Surmonter les Obstacles à l’Inclusion des Jeunes. 

 

38 Observatoire National de la Jeunesse op. cit. (2017) pp. 24, in ADD & UN Women op. cit. (2017) pp. 8. 

 

39 ADD & UN Women op. cit. (2017) pp. 8.

 

40 Meddeb, Hamza (2015) «Rente frontalière et injustice sociale en Tunisie» in L’État d’injustice au Maghreb. Maroc et Tunisie. pp. 63.  

 

41 Ibid.  pp. 64.

 

42 Soudani, Seif op. cit. (27.12.2016).

 

43 Lakhal, Malek & Szakal, Vanessa (27.01.2018), “Interview with Hamza Meddeb: “The system keeps youth at the margins of society”, Nawaat.

 

44 Ibid. 

 

45 Philippe Aghion in Lakhal, Malek & Szakal, Vanessa op. cit. (27.01.2018). 

 

46 Merone , Fabio & Cavatorta, Francesco (2012) “Salafist mouvance and sheikh-ism in the Tunisian democratic transition”, Working Papers in International Studies, n°7/2012. 

 

47 Soudani, Seif op. cit. (27.12.2016). 

 

48 Merone, Fabio & Cavatorta, Francesco op. cit. (2012), pp. 7-8.

 

49 Hamza Meddeb & Georges Fahmi op. cit.  (October 2015). 

 

50 Filiu, J.P. op. cit. (2016) pp. 148-150.

 

51 Tunisian Center for Research and Studies on Terrorism (2016) “Le terrorisme en Tunisie à travers les dossiers judiciaires”.

 

52 ADD & UN Women op. cit. (2017) pp. 4. 

 

53 Popovski, Vesselin (2009) “Religion and War”, in V. Popovski, G. M. Reichberg and N. Turner (eds) World Religions and Norms of War. Tokyo: United Nations University Press, pp. 11–29.

 

54 Aslam, Maleeha op. cit. (2012).

 

55 Ibid. 

 

56 ADD & UN Women op. cit. (2017) pp. 7. 

 

57 ADD & UN Women op. cit. (2017) pp. 5-6. 

 

58 Aslam, Maleeha op. cit. (2012) pp. 4. 

 

59 Olivier Roy (2016) Le djihad et la mort, Paris, Seuil, pp. 18. 

 

60 ADD & UN Women op. cit. (2017) pp.  9.

 

61 Ibid. pp. 10. 

 

62 Soudani, Seif op. cit. (27.12.2016).

 

63 T. H. (21.04.2017) «Qui a envoyé des jeunes tunisiens combattre avec Daech : les premières révélations du ministre de l’Intérieur, Hédi Mejdoub», Leaders. 

 

64 Talani, Leila Simona (2017) «Women, Globalisation and Civil Society in the MENA Area: Between Marginalisation and Radicalisation»

 

65 Talani, Leila Simona op. cit. (2017)

 

66 Ibid. 

 

67 ADD & UN Women op. cit. (2017) pp.  24.

 

68 Ibid. pp. 18. 

 

69 Aslam, Maleeha op. cit. (2012) pp. 80-82.

 

70 Aslam, Maleeha op. cit. (2012) pp. 84. 

 

71 Ibid.  pp. 89.

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